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In the preface to Eclipse Of Reason, written in 1944 as Europe was exhausting one of its greatest 
cycles of transformative violence, Max Horkheimer set himself in favour of thought and against any 
incitement to action which “obliterate[d] that very substance of reason in the name of which this 
progress is espoused” (Horkheimer, 2004:vi). The same sentiment animates the opening passages 
of  On Violence,  in which Slavoj  Žižek rejects the “fake sense of urgency that pervades the left-
liberal humanitarian discourse on violence” (p. 5). Instead, he proposes to 'look awry' at violence, 
to turn contemporary delusions and certainties in such a way as to better perceive a triumvirate: 
not only the 'subjective' violence “performed by a clearly identifiable agent” but also the two forms 
of  'objective'  violence:  the  symbolic  violence  of  language  and  the  systemic  violence  which 
encompasses “the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic and 
political systems” (p. 1). In doing so,  Žižek hopes to disentangle us from our obsession with the 
pornography of  force,  our persistent cries  that  'something must  be done',  and our consequent 
distraction from “the true locus of trouble” (p. 9). 
It is a common enough accusation that Žižek makes more sense out of context than in it, and it is 
still  true that our bursts of comprehension come not from a careful delineation of thought, but 
from provocations, diversions and interruptions. By these standards, there is plenty of insight to 
On Violence,  from the biting characterisation of 'liberal communists' like Bill Gates who peddle 
both the diseases of capitalism and the putative cure of philanthropy (pp. 13-25), to the Lacanian-
inspired racial 'subject supposed to loot and rape' found in media depictions of a post-Katrina New 
Orleans (pp. 79-85). There is a persuasive diagnosis of the Parisian banlieue riots of 2005 as 'zero-
level'  protests,  as  a  politics  consisting  of  the  simple  assertion of  visibility  (pp.  63-69),  and  of 
tolerance  as  an  ideological  category  that  replaces ideas  of  exploitation,  injustice  or  inequality 
through a 'culturalisation of politics' (p. 119). Indeed, much of the book is dedicated to this now 
well-established  critique  of  tolerant  liberal  reason  which,  together  with  arguments  against  the 
analytical  neglect  of  objective violence by 'the left',  builds towards a final  consideration of  the 
nature and promise of revolutionary violence. 
But if Žižek stakes his case through such fragments, through a 'bric-a-brac of reflections', what does 
attention to them tell us about the argument which we are meant to be perceiving awry? Two lines 
of  thought seem particularly promising.  In the first,  Žižek returns to  the obstinate problem of 
ideology,  pursued  in  this  case  as  a  generalised  set  of  social  rules  that  allows  Belief  without 
believers. These implicit codes operate as an “obscene underground” that generates behaviour in 
the face of official disavowal, whether in the gap between homophobia and homosexual innuendo 
in the military or as a 'solution' to the false choice of torture at Abu Ghraib as originating from 
either the highest political authorities or as the initiative of brutal entrepreneurs from the lower 
ranks (pp. 145-150). To see ideology in this way is to understand its capacity for generating inner 
distance and to hint at how objective violence is obscured by its operations. 
In the second compelling theme, a kind of emancipatory potential is recovered for the notion of 
equality-freedom from a reconsideration of the dialectic of the universal and the particular. The 
tension or gap between the brute reality of inequality and formal political rights is not, for Žižek, 
the apparently crude one between a driving socio-economic structure and a peripheral 'echo' but a 
gap in which the superficial  appearance has its  own power to 're-articulate'  relations.  Symbolic 
fictions have efficiency (pp. 127-134). Similarly, 'abstract' notions like 'the rights of women' have a 
universal  power in particular life-worlds,  just  as  specific  struggles intrude on our imagining of 
humanity  as  a  whole,  as  the  particular  “becomes  'for-itself',  and  is  directly  experienced  as  
universal”  (p. 129).  Consequently, it  is not  enough to say that  the claims of universality  mask 
specific  interests,  but  also  to  examine  how  form has  its  own  power  in  a  way  that  ultimately 
undermines  the  particularism  with  which  it  was  invested  (pp.  125-128).  Although  the 
accompanying  caricatures  of  feminists,  post-modernists  and  post-colonialists  obsessed  with 
identity  politics  occasionally  reads  like  a  right-wing  fantasy  (as  if  there  are  legions  of  leftists 
advocating 'respect' for female genital mutilation), this way of putting the problem does escape a 
number  of  false  antagonisms,  transferring  our  attention  to  how we  articulate  the  relationship 
between specificity and generality, between universality and difference, rather than compelling us 
to choose one or other side.
Other themes appear similarly  promising but remain frustratingly insubstantial.  One trajectory 
suggests that fetishistic disavowal is at the heart of any ethics. How, Žižek asks, could one continue 
to eat pork having seen the suffering of animals for oneself? We can only 'go on' if we choose to 
forget, if we accept that our ethico-political programmes must have a constituent outside, and that 
this forgetting is not a flaw but the positive condition of possibility for ethical thought (pp. 45-49). 
As usual, there is something persuasive here. But it is quickly drowned out by the unanswered 
questions such a position raises. For example, at least part of the argument implies that ethical 
commitment is a zero-sum game, so that we must accept, or rather ignore, some forms of suffering 
to alleviate others. Yet that a constant, real-time cognisance of all sentient misery is not possible 
does  not  exhaust  the  claims that  ethical  reasoning may  make on  us.  After  all,  if  to  recognise 
suffering and not act on it is congruent with an ethical life, then what is the ethical status of the 
decision to become a vegetarian? If we previously thought of ethics as following through on one's 
convictions, even if the cost to oneself was great, should we now say that ethics is really about 
ignoring one's own conscience, even if the cost to others is great?  And what are we do with the 
following  paradox:  the  kind  of  position  in  liberal  communism  that  Žižek  lambasts  is  one  of 
fetishistic  disavowal  –  acknowledging  the  painful  inequalities  caused  by  capitalism  but  then 
forgetting  it  in  favour  of  self-satisfaction  at  its  own  philanthropy.  Can  we  not  say  that  this, 
combined with the injunction to think instead of act, is precisely the mind-set best-suited to today's 
postmodern corporate power? 
That would even seem to be an eminently Žižekian position, and there are several provocations in 
On  Violence which  involve  not  only  analytical  thinness,  but  also  this  kind  of  apparent 
contradiction. To take another example, it is argued that the ideological function of 'tolerance' is 
paralleled by the rationalistic attempt to “understand the Other from within”, an attempt which 
actually ends up imputing the most ridiculous beliefs as the true cause of action, as in the thesis 
that suicide bombing is the 'rational' choice of those seeking 400 virgins in paradise (p. 71). But 
this tempting line of thought is somewhat undermined when we are treated to precisely such a 
manoeuvre by Žižek, who claims that both “thoroughly secularised writing” and Monty Python are 
“unimaginable  in  an  Islamic  culture”  (p.  90).  This  view  of  a  monolithic  'Islam'  incapable  of 
religious satire or non-metaphysical reflection is not only inaccurate, but deprives us of the kind of 
psychoanalytical hay that  Žižek might have made of actual Islamic humour, as in the apparent 
wealth of jokes based on the ease with which the Arabic for 'God' can be turned into the word for 
'penis'1.
But  what  of  revolutionary  violence?  Žižek  casts  the  basic  problem  via  the  homology  between 
Freud's dream of Irma's injection and Job's encounter with the brutal will of God. In both cases, 
interpreters attempt to mask the horror of the Real, “to disguise the impact of the trauma with a 
symbolic semblance” (p. 153). Just as Freud and Job should have refused these gestures towards 
intelligibility and closure, so we must refuse the temptations of deeper meaning when considering 
Walter Benjamin's Angel of History. In a series of examples, Žižek makes clear that divine violence 
is not the will of the people, nor the necessary means adopted for a given end. It is not abstract and 
pure. Like the Jacobin Terror, or the Red Terror, it fits Badiou's category of an Event. It lacks any 
Big Other which can confer upon it an agreed meaning within the symbolic order. Neither pure 
violence nor the exception which founds the law, it is like the shattering of identity that goes under 
the name of Love, hence Žižek's invocation of Che Guevara and revolution as “the subject's work of  
love” (p. 172). It follows that divine violence cannot be the tool of a vanguard on behalf of 'the 
people', which is the sense in which Stalin's attempt at collectivisation, valourised here as “truly 
daring...try[ing]  the  impossible”  (p.  177),  was  ultimately  insufficient,  since  it  turned  into  the 
'impotent'  simulacrum of  cleansing that  was the Purges.  Instead,  divine violence is  “the  heroic 
assumption of the solitude of sovereign decision...If it is extra-moral,  it is not 'immoral'...When 
those  outside  the  structured  social  field  strike  'blindly',  demanding  and  enacting  immediate 
justice/vengeance, this is divine violence” (p. 171). 
An obvious immediate problem concerns  Žižek's replication of the binary choice of much liberal 
commentary on revolution. On the one hand, the safe, 'realistic' world of inequality, consumption 
and false 'tolerance', run by a managerialist elite who dispense charity as they reap the rewards of 
the system. On the other, an authentic subaltern resentment, dreams of impossible equality and 
the transformative Event, necessarily horrific, which we cannot assuage with empty attempts at 
incremental progress, or even properly understand with our faulty ethical categories. The relevant 
question, so clarified, simply becomes whether to embrace or oppose such a historic moment. The 
foreclosure of other ways of thinking about social change is evident but the shift from a critique of 
false tolerance to a championing of true acts of revolutionary daring is somewhat obscured by the 
argument's  under-development.  We  do  not  discover  why  the  repudiation  of  all  these  liberal 
ideological vices should lead us so swiftly to an acceptance that only a true Year Zero can realise an 
end to objective violence.
Through  all  this,  Žižek  is  certainly  endorsing  divine  violence  (p.  174),  but  what  kind  of 
endorsement is it? By the closing paragraphs, he is arguing that doing nothing can be the most 
violent  choice,  can  cause  more  upheaval  than  the  current  dreams  of  humanitarians  or  the 
apparently insufficient violence of Mao and Stalin. 'Pseudo-activity' (academic debates, campaigns, 
the creation of  social  space for 'the multitude') only buttresses the violence of  a system which 
thrives on co-opting its adversaries (p. 183). In the hands of a different theorist, this may have 
become a political programme of refusal, an active withdrawing of participation in the games of 
power.  But  Žižek's  version  of  doing  nothing  is  more  thorough-going.  Although  apparently 
paradoxical, it can instead be read as the dialectical materialism of the pessoptimist, as a return to 
a  Marxism  dismissive  of  the  progressive  illusions  of  the  bourgeoisie  but  confident  that  the 
development of capitalism itself will give birth to the divine violence of the proletariat.
Such a reading is starkly in conflict with the idea that 'super-structural' symbols have a meaningful 
impact  on  the  possibilities  of  emancipation.  But  there  is  a  deeper  problem.  Presumably  our 
understanding of what constitutes 'suffering' is part of the symbolic order. The desire to alleviate 
suffering and the  impetus  to  pay  attention to  the  forms of  objective  violence stems from this 
understanding, as does the desire for revolutionary social transformation. But if we are to equate 
'true' revolution with divine violence, and also to claim that divine violence is necessarily the kind 
of Event that remakes the entire symbolic order, then the very foundation on which the appeal to 
revolutionary politics is built dissolves. On what grounds can such an indeterminate re-making of 
the world be cast as desirable or necessary? Does doing so not simply leave us with an empty 
glorification of a contentless Act? Žižek does seem to intend something along these lines, but we do 
not discover how such problems are to be resolved, or even if they count as problems at all. 
In an earlier passage, Žižek revisits anti-Semitism to demonstrate the overdetermined fantasmatic 
dimension of hatred, of the abstract, but libidinally-invested, 'Jew' as the true target of violence (p. 
57).  But it  is  clear that  divine violence plays  a  similar  role in  On Violence,  as  a repository for 
charged fantasies of its transformative potential. Žižek is, of course, too sophisticated a theorist to 
entertain the idea of ever escaping ideology, which is something like the necessary field of human 
experience in his thought, but his embrace of this kind of revolutionary optimism, which passes 
without a serious consideration of  what it  entails,  allows him to commit fully  to the cleansing 
power of history. In this, he comes very close to what he once diagnosed as a kind of right-wing 
Lacanianism2 – the kind that acknowledges the symbolic role of The Father but sees this not as 
subversive  of  authoritarianism  but  as  its  ultimate  support,  the  required  psychoanalytical 
justification  for  whatever  whims  are  to  be  imposed  on  the  family  or  the  nation.  'Enjoy  your 
Symptom!' indeed. 
In fact, what the sections on divine violence reveal is the fetishistic disavowal at the heart of Žižek's 
own position – a simultaneous desire to claim that,  despite its  origins,  the formal language of 
universal rights has ushered in a series of genuinely emancipatory developments and to see all our 
ways of thinking about egalitarian politics as so impoverished as to necessitate the accumulated 
wrath of pure resentment enacted by a coming, but obscured, revolutionary Subject. There is both 
an appeal for thought over action and an implication that the kind of reclamation of reason and 
enlightenment that Horkheimer demanded is illusory. And it would seem then that inner distance 
is not simply the mark of ideology at work in contemporary militarism but also an attitude towards 
necessary violence that we must accommodate, if not cultivate, at least in as far as we should set 
aside  the  concerns  and revulsion that  would otherwise  form our  reaction to  its  consequences, 
“crazy and tasteless as it may sound” (p. 183). 
So by the end of  On Violence, we are faced not so much with a triumvirate of violence as with a 
fulcrum and a strangely inverse relationship. In one scenario the two forms of objective violence 
persist and grow as we devote attention to the more superficial crimes of subjective violence. In the 
other,  the  eruption  of  (divine)  Subjective  violence  is  the  necessary  cost  for  the  possibility  of 
eradicating objective violence, an aim that requires bloody raids on the territory of the impossible. 
So it is that the possibility of investing our politics with an opposition to all three forms of violence 
evaporates, unremarked. And if there can be no such wholeness in our thinking, and no building of 
the  structure of  the  new society within the  shell  of  the  old,  and if  the  extension of  particular 
struggles into the realm of the universal is to be superseded by a  deus in machina, how will we 
decide whether what is to come is nightmare or utopia?
Notes:
1.  See  Kishtainy (1985:12-13).  Both  of  Žižek's characterisations of  Islamic  culture are  common 
myths, briefly dealt with by Halliday (2005:23-25, 85-86).
2. During his 'Master Class on Jacques Lacan: A Lateral Introduction', May-June 2006, Birkbeck 
College, University of London
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